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Abstract
This article suggests a rationale for statutes of limitations in sales law,
i.e. for the practice of cutting oﬀ buyers’ remedies after the expiration of
a limitation period. The rationale is based on the notion of wear and tear,
which carries two implications: First, a good that breaks down after several
periods of use is likely to be of nearly optimal quality, and in this case little
is gained by allowing a claim. Second, the number of dysfunctions is likely
to increase over time, which implies that the pool of potential claims, and
in particular the pool of unjustified claims, is likely to increase over time.
It will be shown theoretically that these implications can provide a ratio-
nale for cutting oﬀ claims. The rationale will be supported with empirical
evidence stemming from a recent extension of the limitation period from
one to two years in Denmark.
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1. Introduction
In the area of consumer sales law, statutes of limitations are criticized for
lowering the incentive for producers of avoiding defects that occur after the ex-
piration of the limitation period. Naturally, barring claims lowers administrative
costs, but the question arises why older claims should be more administratively
costly or less valuable in terms of deterrence than claims of more recent origin.
One answer is that evidence deteriorates over time1, and that older claims are
hence more costly and more likely to result in error, but in the context of sales
the relevant evidence typically concerns the state of the good at the time of the
dysfunction rather than at the time of purchase2. Another answer focuses on the
fact that buyer’s use the good with diﬀerent intensity, and explains the limited
duration of warranties as a response to buyer moral hazard 3. However, as will
be further explained below, buyer moral hazard is less important when the buyer
bears the burden of proof, as she generally does within the rules of sales law, but
generally does not do within the terms of a warranty agreement. Other answers
have been provided, but none that applies well to sales law, and so the question
in eﬀect remains unanswered. This is unfortunate not only for policy making but
also potentially for private contracting parties in search of a principle for deter-
mining the duration of the buyer’s claim for remedies while putting the burden
of proof concerning the nature of the defect on the buyer.
The present article suggests a rationale based on the obvious observation that
most goods lose functionality over time, since it is not economically optimal (nor
perhaps even possible) to secure the longevity of goods beyond some future point.
Hence, the dysfunctions which are socially worth preventing will tend to become
fewer in number over time, and each dysfunction will tend to become only mar-
ginally worthwhile preventing. Thus, the beneficial eﬀect on incentives of allowing
a claim is likely to fall over time, while there is no reason to believe the same
about the administrative cost per claim, which may even increase as uncertainty
about the validity of the claim increases over time. In conclusion, the ratio of
the incentive benefit to the administrative cost is likely to fall over time, and, as
will be argued further below, it may then be better to cut oﬀ claims entirely at
1This argument is made by Landes and Posner [9], as further described in the literature
review below.
2In some cases, the reasonable expectations of the buyer need to be taken into account, and
evidence of this kind may of course deteriorate.
3See e.g. Cooper and John[3], Dybvig and Lutz [4]. Emons [5] explains the limited duration
of warranties in terms of adverse selection, see below.
2
some point than to e.g. introduce time-increasing standards of proof or increasing
administrative fees for raising claims.
The rationale can also be formulated as follows. It is well-known that the
incentive for parties to litigate may be socially inoptimal even though the parties
carry the costs of litigation themselves, see e.g. Shavell [14]. That is, under a
rule of strict liability, which is in an approximate sense the rule of sales law, if the
deterrent eﬀect of litigation is small, litigation can be excessive. If the incentive
to produce goods of suﬃcient quality induced by the buyer’s access to remedies
falls over time, and if it is not feasible to increase fees for raising claims over time,
it may be optimal to bar claims from some point in time onwards, especially in
the context of sales law where the incentive eﬀect of claims is modified by the fact
that producers and sellers often have the incentive to maintain a good reputation
with customers.
The trade-oﬀ between incentives and administrative costs will be formalized
below, and empirical data will be presented to demonstrate the real-world nature
of the trade-oﬀ. The data indicate that retailers left out quality goods from their
selection as a consequence of the legal change, and also indicate a rise in at the
number of both justified and unjustified claims following the extension of the
limitation period.
Two additional remarks: First, the optimal limitation period will be diﬀerent
for diﬀerent goods, and if the legal rule can only stipulate one period, it must
be determined as perhaps a weighted average of goods for which the limitation
period plays a role. Moreover, for especially long-lived goods the seller is likely to
oﬀer a warranty that outlasts the average optimal average period, and these goods
should then of course not enter into the average. Second, the administrative costs
include the time spent by the buyer and the seller in verifying the nature of the
dysfunction, in negotiating about the remedy, and in occasionally litigating the
claim. Verification can obviously be costly as when it involves technical investiga-
tions4, and so can time consuming and potentially unpleasant discussions at the
shop level, often mentioned by retailers.
Section 2 analyzes the legal framework, and section 3 presents an overview
of the literature bearing on limitation periods. Section 4 presents and analyzes a
model in which the rationale for a limitation period arises from a trade-of between
incentives and administrative costs. Section 5 takes up the point that only un-
warranted clams arise in the equilibrium of the model. The section discusses how
4Such investigations are particularly likely to be undertaken when the parties diﬀer in their
beliefs about the origin of the dysfunction.
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the rationale extends to situations where warranted claims arise in equilibrium.
Section 6 presents the empirical data, and section 7 provides final remarks.
2. Legal Framework
The legal framework to be addressed here concerns the extension of default
and mandatory limitation periods, the remedies available to the buyer, rules con-
cerning the burden of proof, and the definition of a defective (or non-performing)
good. Readers not interested in the legal rules may skip this section; the model
can be understood without the details presented below. However, as will become
clear, the legal detail is in eﬀect relevant for the determination of the optimal
duration of the limitation period.
The law in most countries stipulates both a default limitation period which
applies when the parties have not agreed otherwise, and a mandatory minimum
limitation period (a shorter period is not allowed) that applies for consumer sales.
The default limitation period varies widely between countries. For example, Fin-
land has no default limitation period, which means that in the absence of a con-
tractual agreement, the general limitation period of ten years applies, while in
Denmark, the default period is two years for both sales to consumers and to busi-
nesses. The EU-directive 1999/44/EF, which was implemented in Denmark in
2002, required member states to adopt a minimum period of no less than two
years for consumer sales.
In terms of remedies available to the buyer, the law distinguishes consumer
contracts from business-to-business contracts. As part of the implementation of
the EU-Directive, Danish consumer law now grants the consumer the choice be-
tween repair and replacement unless the cost of replacement is disproportionately
high, in which case the seller can insist on repair5. Before the implementation
of the directive, the choice belonged to the seller, which remains the case for
business-to-business contracts. The seller has a right to perform, in the sense
that he can insist on either repairing or replacing the good, before the consumer
(or the business buyer - the law does not distinguish in this regard) can claim a
reduction in price or cancel (terminate) the contract.
Two specific rules may provide independent reason for limiting the duration of
claims6: First, when the type of good purchased has been technically improved,
5When the particular type of good is no longer being produced, e.g. because it has been
replaced by improved versions, the buyer has a right to a good of similar quality to the one
originally purchased. This rule is addressed in the final section of this article.
6I am grateful to Lars Quistgård Bay, chief legal advisor to the Danish Chamber of Commerce,
for bringing my attention to these further considerations.
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sellers can be required to oﬀer the new improved product to the buyer as a re-
placement (when the old type is no longer produced and repair is not an option).
Second, when a good is replaced, the new limitation period starts from the point
in time of the replacement, which sequentially may provide the buyer with a pro-
longed period of remedies. These rules are costly to sellers/producers and would
in the absence of a limitation period at some point become ineﬃcient7.
As part of the implementation of the EU directive, a presumption rule was
enacted that transfers the burden of proof from the consumer to the seller for the
first six months after sale. During this period, the dysfunction will presumptively
be due to a defect (which implies that it was present at the time of purchase).
Finally, as will be important in the context of the model, the legal definition of
a defective good recognizes that goods are neither supposed to last forever nor to
be able to withstand all types of uses or external conditions. For example, it may
not be considered a defect if a mobile phone breaks down after heavy use over
several years, or if it breaks down due to exposure to abnormal temperatures. The
legal rule lays down that a breakdown should only be considered non-performance
when the dysfunction should not have been expected by a rational buyer (with
regard also to the price of the product).
3. The Literature
The issue of the optimal extension of limitation periods in sales law seems
not to have been addressed in the law and economics literature. However, as
mentioned, a closely related economic literature explains why warranties are of
limited duration, based on the idea that buyers’ use of products is subject to moral
hazard. The idea is that as time passes defects become increasingly more likely
to be caused by wrong usage, and increasingly less likely to be caused by original
defects, see e.g. Dybvig and Lutz [4], and Cooper and Ross [3]. Cutting oﬀ claims
at some point will then provide the second-best combination of buyer and seller
incentives. As mentioned, this theory cannot, however, be directly applied to
limitation periods, since warranties typically expand the rights of consumers by
transferring the burden of proof to the seller, whereas sales law allocates it to the
buyer8. When the buyer bears the burden of proof, the possibility of wrong usage
as a (hidden) cause of the dysfunction cannot in itself justify limitation periods,
7Naturally, one might modify these rules, but this involves a trade-oﬀ, and it might be
preferable to grant a high level of protection of the buyer for a short time rather than a lower
level of protection for a longer period.
8with the exception of the first six months after purchase, for consumer sales, as noted above.
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since when wrong usage has caused the dysfunction, the claim is already cut oﬀ by
the requirement that the buyer must prove the defect. The arguments raised by
Cooper and Ross, and by Dybvig and Lutz rely on the seller carrying the burden
of proof: the moral hazard of the buyer is considerably less important when the
burden of proof is on the buyer.
Emons [5] explains the limited duration of warranties in terms of the producer’s
attempt to screen low-intensity users from high-intensity users. applies more to
warranties than to a policy makers setting of a default limitation period. , which
is the subject here.
An alternative explanation has been provided in the neighboring field of prod-
uct liability law. Miceli [12] derives optimal statutes of limitations and statutes
of repose9 based on a trade-oﬀ between incentives and administrative costs10.
Longer duration increases incentives for care, but also increases the number of
claims and hence administrative costs. But why should older claims be less likely
to be worth their administrative cost in terms of accident prevention than younger
ones? Miceli argues that a claim raised in period t + τ aﬀects the injurer’s in-
centives less than a claim raised at time t, because the injurer discounts future
litigation costs when deciding the level of care. For this reason, the prospect
of preventing a claim from arising at time t + τ is less important to the injurer
compared with preventing a claim from arising at time τ 11. Discounting future lit-
igation costs seems, however, to be a more salient issue in product liability, where
many years can pass from the time of the sale (or from the time of an accident)
to when damages become apparent, as compared with sales law where limitation
periods tend to be one, two or three years. Intuitively, the eﬀect of discounting
on future litigation costs seems of limited importance for sales12.
Landes and Posner [9] emphasize that evidence deteriorates over time, and
that trials occurring long after the sale of the good are therefore both more costly
in terms of evidence production and more likely to result in error, as compared to
trials occurring shortly after the sale, when more can be remembered and more
9Statutes of repose run from when the good was sold while statutes of limitations (generally)
run from the time the accident occurred. Time may pass from when the accident occurs to the
filing of a claim, e.g. because the victim does not discover the damage immediately.
10See also and Baker and Miceli [1] for an empirical analysis.
11Note that the social costs of litigation should also be discounted back in time; Miceli’s
rationale holds when the incentive eﬀect on incentives of the injurer’s discounting of future
litigation costs outweighs the discounting of total litigation costs.
12Miceli’s result also seems to hinge (to some extent) on the assumption of the American rule
for allocating litigation costs.
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evidence is available. When error is more likely, the costs of litigation are harder
to justify by their eﬀect on deterrence. This explanation can account for the ubiq-
uitousness of limitation periods in law (since many kinds of evidence deteriorate
over time), but it suﬀers from two drawbacks in the context of sales law. First,
it must account for why for old claims the standard of proof cannot instead be
raised, which would cut oﬀ dubious claims while allowing clearly warranted claims.
As will be mentioned below, this drawback is shared to some extent with the ra-
tionale presented in this paper. Second, as mentioned, and more importantly,
deteriorating evidence does not seem to play a dominant role in the context of
sales, where the main issue to be resolved is whether the good has met reasonable
expectations, which can often be answered without the use of historic evidence.
It has been suggested, e.g. by Martin [11], that cutting oﬀ claims allows
businesses (and consumers) to ‘close their books’, i.e. to dispose of old files.
Again, however, this concern does not seem very important in the area of sales
contracts. Specific details about the product are typically not needed to assess a
dysfunction, and the buyer must keep proof of purchase.
Finally, shifting risk from the seller to the buyer may be thought to justify
limitation periods, but why the creditor (the buyer) bears the risk at lower cost
needs to be explained. The seller may be a large firm while the buyer may be
a consumer or a small firm averse to risk. It seems diﬃcult to account for the
widespread use of limitation periods in private contracts on the basis of risk-
allocation.
In the following section it is analyzed under which assumptions the rationale
based on a trade-oﬀ between incentives and administrative costs can be main-
tained.
4. The Model
Within a two period model, the question to be analyzed is under which con-
ditions it is worth cutting oﬀ the buyers’ claims after the first period, i.e. under
which conditions the administrative costs saved by cutting oﬀ claims after the
first period outweigh the dilution of the sellers’ incentives for producing goods of
adequate quality.
To formulate the idea that a good may be subject to more or less strain,
states of nature will be indexed by the strain they impose on the product; a
higher state signifies greater strain. Thus, the state space will be the interval Θ =
[0,∞] in both periods of the model, and the quality or endurance of the good
will be indexed by the critical state (number) in the interval it can withstand;
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if the state (and hence the strain) is higher, the good will dysfunction. Denote
the quality of producer i by qi and the state in period 1 which the good can
withstand by σqi, where σ > 0, such that a level of quality qi can be expected to
ensure functionality in the interval [0,σqi]in period 1. Wear and tear can then be
introduced by assuming that the good can withstand only the state ρqi in period
2, where ρ < σ.
A judge will find the good defective if it is below some required quality level,
qr. The corresponding states which the good is expected to endure in the two
respective periods are then θr1 = σq
r and θr2 = ρq
r.
The individual seller i selects a level of quality qi from the set [0; q] , where
for convenience and without loss of generality, an upper bound is set on quality.
Then, if e.g. the product becomes dysfunctional in a state θ1 < σqr in the first
period, the product is defective (for it should only become dysfunctional in higher
states), and the buyer then has a claim on the seller, while if it becomes defective
in a state θ1 > σqr, the buyer does not have a claim on the seller, but must pay
for the repair herself.
As is standard, buyers are assumed to know the average quality of goods (i.e.
which states the goods can usually withstand), but are assumed to be unable to
observe the quality of the product of any individual seller. In reality, the producer
rather than the seller determines quality and the seller can abrogate claims on the
producer; this (frequent) source of conflict will not be part of the analysis; the
producer and the seller will for analytical simplicity be lumped together as the
seller.
In the absence of liability for defective goods, an individual seller i will have
an incentive to save on costs by free-riding on the quality delivered by the other
sellers. Naturally, if all sellers do so, the price will fall in the market as buyers
anticipate or learn about the level of quality provided. An equilibrium arises when
no seller has an incentive to lower or raise the quality even though an individual
seller can lower quality at no reduction in price.
It will be assumed for simplicity that the strain to which the good is likely to
be exposed is the same in both periods; the density function of states (strains) in
both periods will be h(θ). To avoid uninteresting mathematical complications, it
will be assumed that h is bounded above.
The product will be repaired in period 1 if it becomes dysfunctional - the
question is only who should pay for the repair- and for simplicity, it will then be
assumed to be of the same durability in period two, and treated as if it had not
been dysfunctional in period 1.
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The cost of producing quality q will be denoted C(q), and the marginal cost
C 0(q) will be denoted c(q). For simplicity and to secure interior solutions, it will
be assumed that c(0) = 0, c(q)→∞ as q → q, and that c0(q) > 0.
The state-space approach allows a simple way of modeling mistakes. When
a good breaks down, the buyer may either mistake the strain imposed on the
good or the required level of qualities θr1 and θ
r
2. Thus, when a good breaks down,
the buyer compares her estimate of the state with her estimate of θr, and if she
believes θr is higher than θ, i.e. that the good ought to withstand the perceived
strain, she will think she has a warranted claim for remedies, and will then raise a
claim13. The probability that she mistakes the diﬀerence between the actual and
the required state by x will be denoted f(x) with distribution function F (x), both
defined on the interval ]0;∞[ .When the state is θ and the required level of quality
is θr, the buyer will make a claim when her mistake is larger than (θ− θr). Since
the probability of a smaller mistake than (θ − θr) is F (θ− θr), the probability of
a mistake equal to or larger than (θ − θr) equals 1− F (θ − θr).
State verification (and communication) costs are incurred when the buyer
states she has a warranted claim. Whether the statement by the buyer is true
or false, it will be costly for the parties to verify the state of nature; the costs of
state verification14 will be τs and τb for the seller and the buyer, respectively. By
incurring these costs, the parties will discover the true state; the repair will be
paid by the buyer if the claim is unwarranted and by the seller if it is warranted.
For simplicity, the buyer will be assumed to raise a claim whenever she believes
she has a warranted claim. In reality, a buyer will compare the cost of raising a
claim with the potential savings from shifting the repair cost to the seller, but
introducing this aspect would complicate the analysis without adding insight of
direct relevance to the main points here15. What is needed for the present analysis
is the assumption that some people will raise unwarranted claims despite the cost
of so doing, and this seems likely under a range of plausible assumptions.
When the required standard is θr, the likelihood of a unwarranted claim raised
by the buyer then equals
∞Z
θr
(1− F (θ − θr)h(θ)dθ.
The equilibrium when claims are never cut oﬀ will now be compared with
that where claims are cut oﬀ after the first period. It will then be argued that
13On the incentive to raise a claim, see below.
14This is Townsend’s costly state-verification principle [16].
15See Miceli [12] and Hylton [8] for modeling that does take the incentives for filing a claim
into account.
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the incentive loss vanishes when ρ becomes small, while administration costs are
unlikely to fall as much as the incentive eﬀect.
4.1. The Equilibrium When Claims Are Never Cut Oﬀ
For qi to be an optimal choice of quality, it must not be in the interest of seller
i to unilaterally lower or raise the quality from that level. When the required
quality level is qr and claims are allowed in both periods, the cost to the seller of
delivering quality qi ≤ qr, will be the following. First, the cost of producing quality
qi will be C(qi). Second, in the intervals [qiσ; qrσ] and [qiρ; qrρ] , the good will be
dysfunctional and claims will be warranted. Verifying the validity of the claim will
incur a cost to the seller as will the repair. Hence, the cost of warranted claims
will be
qrσR
qiσ
(R+τs)h(θ)dθ in period 1, while it will be
qrρR
qiρ
(R+τs)h(θ)dθ in period 2.
Third, in the states ]qrσ;∞[and ]qrρ;∞[ , the buyer will raise a claim whenever she
is suﬃciently mistaken about the state, and this will impose a cost τs on the seller;
the repair will be paid by the buyer since it will be discovered that (while the good
was in eﬀect dysfunctional) the dysfunction cannot be considered a defect. Hence,
the repair cost does not enter as a cost to the seller in those states. Fourth, in the
states ]qrσ;∞[and ]qrρ;∞[ , the buyer will raise a claim whenever she is suﬃciently
mistaken about the state, and this will impose a cost τs on the seller. There will
be no cost of repair to the seller, since it will be discovered that (while the good
was in eﬀect dysfunctional) the dysfunction cannot be ascribed to the good being
defective. Hence, the cost of mistaken claims will be
∞R
qrσ
τs(1−F (θ− qrσ)))h(θ)dθ
and
∞R
qrρ
τs(1 − F (θ − qrρ)))h(θ)dθ in the respective periods. Thus, the total cost
from producing a level of quality below par is:
(A) : C(qi)+
qrσR
qiσ
(R+τs)h(θ)dθ+
qrρR
qiρ
(R+τs)h(θ)dθ+
∞R
qrσ
τs(1−F (θ−qrσ)))h(θ)dθ
+
∞R
qrρ
τs(1− F (θ − qrρ)))h(θ)dθ
On the other hand, when delivering qi ≥ qr, the total cost to the seller becomes
(B) : C(qi) +
∞R
qiσ
τs(1− F (θ − qrσ))h(θ)dθ +
∞R
qiρ
τs(1− F (θ − qrρ))h(θ)dθ
Raising the quality then only serves the purpose of preventing breakdowns
that may be mistaken for defects.
The question is which qi minimizes total cost. It will now be shown that,
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subject to a suﬃcient but not necessary condition on the second order derivative16,
any q fulfilling:
(C) : τs(1− F (0)) <
c(q)
σh(qσ) + ρh(qρ)
< R+ τs
will be an optimal response if it is the legally required level of quality.
Proof: see Appendix A
To narrow down the set of equilibria, the legal system will be assumed to
require the eﬃcient level of quality. This is given as the solution to:
(D) :
c(q)
σh(qσ) + ρh(qρ)
= R
This equilibrium selection does not prejudice the analysis against allowing claims;
if the judge were assumed to require an ineﬃcient level of quality and this leads
to a rationale for not allowing claims (undoing the ineﬃciency created by the
judge), the result might be said to follow from the equilibrium selection. On
the other hand, the equilibrium selection can be criticized for not allowing the
judge to maximize social welfare by taking into account the administrative cost
of handling claims. The judge may seek the social optimum by in essence cutting
oﬀ claims that are not clearly worth their administrative cost. This possibility
will be discussed in the final section below.
Denote the solution to (D) by q∗. It will be assumed that R > τs(1 − F (0)),
such that when q∗ is required it will be optimal for the seller to deliver that (and
not a higher) level of quality. q∗ will then not only be the required level of quality,
but also the actual level of quality delivered by each seller as well as the level of
quality expected by the buyer.
4.2. The Equilibrium When Claims Are Cut Oﬀ After One Period
Denote the level of quality when claims are cut oﬀ by q∗l , where the subscript
l stands for the existence of a limitation period. Following the logic presented
above, q∗l is the solution to
c(q)
σh(qσ) = R.
Note that q∗ > q∗l , since ρh(qρ) > 0 and c
0(q) > 0.
16The second-order condition requires c0(qi) − σ2(R + τs)h0(qiσ) − ρ2(R + τs)h0(qiρ) to be
positive. This will be fulfilled e.g. when h is close to a uniform distribution (for then h0 will
be near zero), if h is normally distributed and quality is at the right hand side of the normal
distribution where the derivative h0 is negative, and it will generally be fulfilled if c0(q) is high.
11
4.3. The Eﬀect on Incentives of Cutting Oﬀ Claims
It will now be shown that the incentive loss from cutting oﬀ claims after one
period will diminish with the extent to which wear and tear sets in. The parameter
ρ expresses the extent of wear and tear, i.e. the extent to which goods naturally
tend to become dysfunctional over time, and the result will be that as wear and
tear becomes more important, i.e. as ρ decreases, the incentive eﬀect of cutting oﬀ
claims diminishes. The incentive eﬀect is given by the diﬀerence between q∗ and
ql, i.e. by the diﬀerence between q∗ given by
c(q∗)
σh(q∗σ)+ρh(q∗ρ) = R and ql given by
c(ql)
σh(qlσ)
= R. Consider the limiting case where ρ approaches zero. The important
point is that the diﬀerence between q∗ and ql will then approach zero. This follows
from the fact that ρh(q∗ρ)) can be made arbitrarily small when ρ converges to zero,
given the assumption that h is bounded above. Moreover, when q∗ approaches ql,
the loss in terms of allocative eﬃciency will also approach zero. This follows from
a comparison of total costs when claims are cut oﬀ after one period with total
costs when claims are cut oﬀ after two periods (i.e. never). The total costs when
q = q∗l are C(q
∗
l )+
∞Z
q∗
l
σ
(Rh(θ)dθ+
∞R
q∗
l
ρ
Rh(θ)dθ, while the total costs when q = q∗ are
C(q∗) +
∞Z
q∗σ
(Rh(θ)dθ +
∞R
q∗ρ
Rh(θ)dθ. The diﬀerence between these two constitutes
the allocative loss (disregarding administrative costs) of cutting oﬀ claims after
one period. The allocative loss is
C(q∗l )− C(q∗) +
q∗σZ
q∗
l
σ
(Rh(θ)dθ +
q∗ρZ
q∗
l
ρ
Rh(θ)dθ
which clearly converges towards zero when q∗l converges towards q
∗.
The intuition is straightforward. As a consequence of wear and tear, the
number of states for which it is optimal to prevent dysfunction as compared with
repairing the good when it becomes dysfunctional decreases over time. While it
will remain optimal from the viewpoint of allocative eﬃciency to allow claims in
the final period (since only dysfunctions worth preventing are considered defects),
preventing dysfunctions that occur in the final period (and not before) will become
increasingly costly and only marginally worthwhile17.
17Naturally, the point where this occurs will be diﬀerent for diﬀerent goods.
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4.4. On the Eﬃciency of Cutting Oﬀ Claims After the First Period
In reality, both warranted and unwarranted claims give rise to administrative
costs whereas only unwarranted claims arise in the model. It will now be shown
that if a fraction β (however small) of mistakes leads to claims, there will be a
rationale for cutting oﬀ claims at some point. The following proposition concerns
the limit when ρ converges to zero, but the same eﬀects as will be shown to apply
in the limit apply also outside the limit18.
Proposition: When f(x) > 0, h(θ) is bounded above, and a positive fraction
β (however small) of buyers who mistakenly believe they hold a warranted claim
raise their claim, then when ρ is suﬃciently small, i.e. when wear and tear is
suﬃciently important, the savings from cutting oﬀ claims in the second period
exceed the loss due to the seller’s diminished incentives for delivering quality.
Proof: When claims are allowed in both periods, and the fraction β of buyers,
who mistakenly believe they hold a warranted claim, raise a claim, total costs to
both buyers and sellers become:
(E) : C(q∗) +
∞R
q∗σ
Rh(θ)dθ +
∞R
q∗ρ
Rh(θ)dθ +
∞R
q∗σ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗σ))h(θ)dθ
+β
∞R
q∗ρ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗ρ))h(θ)dθ
When claims are cut oﬀ after the first period, total costs are:
C(q∗l ) +
∞R
q∗
l
σ
Rh(θ)dθ +
∞R
q∗
l
ρ
Rh(θ)dθ + β
∞R
q∗
l
σ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗l σ))h(θ)dθ
Subtracting total costs when claims are cut oﬀ from total costs when claims
are not cut oﬀ yields:
C(q∗l )− C(q∗) +
q∗σZ
q∗
l
σ
(Rh(θ)dθ +
q∗ρZ
q∗
l
ρ
Rh(θ)dθ +
β
∞Z
q∗
l
σ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗l σ))h(θ)dθ −
β
∞Z
q∗σ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗σ))h(θ)dθ − β
∞Z
q∗ρ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗ρ))h(θ)dθ
18It is clear that claims should not be allowed when ρ = 0, since there are then no valid claims,
only administrative costs due to invalid claims. However, this does not bring out the forces that
determine the optimal cut oﬀ level before ρ = 0.
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When ρ is small, so is the incentive eﬀect of disallowing claims as argued above. As
ρ converges to 0, q∗ will converge towards ql, and β
∞Z
q∗
l
σ
(τs+τb)(1−F (θ−q∗l σ))h(θ)dθ
will converge towards
β
∞Z
q∗σ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗σ))h(θ)dθ
Hence, the net eﬀect of disallowing claims in the second period is the saving of
error costs in the second period: β
∞R
q∗ρ
(τs+ τb)(1−F (θ− q∗ρ))h(θ)dθ. As a central
point, this cost will not fall to zero and may well increase when q∗ρ falls. It cannot
converge to zero as ρ converges to zero, given the assumptions that h(θ) > 0 and
f(x) > 0. To verify, take some interval of length ∂ to the right of origo. This
interval will occur with positive probability, π. On this interval, (1−F (θ− q∗ρ))
will fall as θ increases, since the probability of larger mistakes falls with the size
of the mistake. Take the value of (1−F (θ− q∗ρ)) at the end point of the interval,
1 − F (∂ − q∗ρ). This will be a positive number given that the probability of an
even larger mistake will remain positive by the assumption that f(x) > 0. Hence,
the error cost β
∞R
q∗ρ
(τs + τb)(1− F (θ − q∗ρ))h(θ)dθ will in the limit not fall below
β(τs+τb)π(1−F (∂−q∗ρ)), which are all strictly positive numbers. Since the cost
of handling unwarranted claims is hence strictly positive, it will be advantageous
to cut oﬀ claims when ρ becomes suﬃciently small, i.e. when the allocative loss
becomes suﬃciently small. QED.
The result presents the trade-oﬀ in an intuitive way. The number of states
in which dysfunctions are defects tends to decrease over time, while the number
of states in which dysfunctions are the natural consequence of wear and tear
increases. Even if only a small fraction of the increasing number of naturally
occurring dysfunctions are viewed by buyers as defects and lead to claims, the
costs of unwarranted claims will at one point exceed the positive incentive eﬀect
of allowing claims.
The model departs from reality in one important respect that now needs to
be addressed.
5. On Warranted Claims in Equilibrium
There were no warranted claims in the equilibrium of the model, whereas in
reality, warranted claims arise for several reasons. One reason is that it may not
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be optimal for the producer to deliver adequate quality when not all buyers raise
claims. Raising a claim is costly to the buyer and the cost may not always be
worth the often uncertain outcome. When warranted claims arise for this reason,
it is ambiguous whether it strengthens the rationale for cutting oﬀ claims. On the
one hand, cutting oﬀ claims will reduce the producer incentive further which in
itself is ineﬃcient, but this loss of incentives may not be great, since the situation
is one where the producer is already not eﬀectively deterred by the prospect
of claims. On the other hand, administrative costs may be incurred without a
compensating eﬀect on incentives. Consider for illustration the case where quality
is either 0 or 1, and where too few claims are raised for it to be worthwhile for the
producer to produce quality 1. Cutting oﬀ claims will under these assumptions
save administrative costs (of those claims that are raised) without aﬀecting quality.
Another reason for warranted claims to arise is that some claims will be deemed
to be warranted by a judge although in fact they would not be in a world of
perfect information. For example, the durability of a good may be probabilistic,
and it may be too expensive for a producer to reduce to zero the probability of
breakdown. Thus, if the good turns out to be sub-par, which need not be due
to negligence on the part of the producer, the producer will still be liable for
remedies. Also, the judge will find for the buyer when there is a preponderance
of evidence in her favor, which implies that the judge will sometimes make a
wrong determination19. In sum, some claims which are in fact unwarranted (or
which would be considered unwarranted by an omniscient judge) will be judged
warranted, and there will be an incentive for the buyer to raise such claims.
Evidently, the rationale suggested above will be strengthened by the existence of
such claims, since they are costly to administer but do not add to eﬃciency.
Attention is now directed at the empirical evidence. The question to be ad-
dressed is whether the eﬀects postulated in the model can be found in the data.
6. Empirical Part
6.1. The Evidence
In 2003, as the eﬀect of the new law began to show in its second year, a survey
was conducted (see [10]) involving retailers of durable goods. Of 1,300 question-
naires sent out, about 300 responded and of these, 291 responses were useful. The
sectors were: used cars, new cars, computers and standard software, women’s and
men’s clothing, electric home appliances, furniture, radio and television, shoes,
19Finally, producers may make mistakes, of course.
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and telecommunication products. Also, we obtained statistics from the Organiza-
tion of Wholesale Distributors of Consumer Electronics in Denmark (BFE), which
showed the increase in the number of repairs and replacements within this sector
as a consequence of the legal changes introduced in 2002.
The data concern the eﬀect on retailers’ quality selection of goods and the
eﬀect on the number of claims and overall administrative costs.
6.2. Empirical Findings Concerning the Impact on Incentives
Table 1 below reveals that the extension of the limitation period seems to have
aﬀected retailers’ quality selection of goods. The survey question asked was:
Have you, on the basis of the parameter in question 5a or 5b, discontinued the
sale of any goods which were resulting in too many complaints?
Table 1
Sectors I F No Do not know answers
All sectors 14.2% 29.1% 53.8% 2.9% 275
Used cars 22.7% 36.4% 31.8% 9.1% 22
Cars 11.5% 19.2% 69.2% .0% 26
Computers and software 18.8% 39.1% 39.1% 3.1% 64
Household appliances 18.2% 18.2% 59.1% 4.5% 22
Furniture 16.1% 19.4% 64.5% .0% 31
Radio and television 12.5% 28.1% 59.3% 3.1% 32
Clothing 6.3% 28.1% 72.7% 6.3% 32
Shoes 10.0% 30.0% 60.0% .0% 30
Telecommunication 6.3% 31.3% 62.5% .0% 16
I: Yes, it has indeed aﬀected our range of products
F: Yes, but only in very few cases
Question 5a referred to in the question concerned whether customers bring
claims more frequently than before whereas question 5b concerned the extension
of the limitation period.
Thus, in the aggregate, 14% of the respondents answered that it had in fact
influenced their selection while 29% had made changes but only in a few cases. The
remaining 54% of the sellers had made no changes. This indicates that although
many are unaﬀected, seller behavior has been aﬀected in the direction one would
expect, and to a non-negligible extent. One other caveat should be mentioned.
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Although the question explicitly refers to the eﬀect of the increase in claims, there
is a possibility that the respondents fail to distinguish this from the eﬀect of the
presumption rule. Note for example that selection has been more heavily aﬀected
for used cars than for new cars which might well have to do with the presumption
rule. However, it is hard to imagine the presumption rule plays a very significant
role for televisions or radios, where a dysfunction shortly after purchase indicates
an original defect (unless the item has been dropped in which case there will often
be damage to suggest this). Yet, selection has been significantly aﬀected also for
television and radios, suggesting that the extended limitation period has indeed
played an important role20.
6.3. Empirical Findings Concerning Administrative Costs
6.3.1 The Increase in the Number of Claims
The survey question asked was: Do your customers make more claims now than
before the change of law? The possible answers were: a) Much more frequently,
b) A little more frequently, c) No change, d) Do not know.
The answers are shown in Table 2:
Table 2
Sectors M.m.f L.m.f No change Do not know answers
All sectors 6.2% 23.4% 67.0% 3.4% 291
Used cars 9.1% 31.8% 50.0% 9.1% 22
Cars .0% 37.9% 62.1% .0% 29
Computers and software 3.1% 16.9% 76.9% 3.1% 65
Household appliances 4.3% 17.4% 78.3% .0% 23
Furniture 12.5% 28.1% 53.1% 6.3% 32
Radio and television 5.3% 15.8% 71.1% 7.9% 38
Clothing .0% 24.2% 72.7% 3.0% 33
Shoes 9.4% 25.0% 65.6% .0% 32
Telecommunication 23.5% 23.5% 52.9% .0% 17
M.m.f: Much more frequently
L.m.f: A little more frequently
20It should be added that some retailers may also been aﬀected by consumers’ increased right
to demand a replacement. Survey responses revealed that there was a marked increase in the
number of replacements, although many retailers simply disregarded the law in this regard (see
Møgelvang-Hansen and Lando (2006)).
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Note that the presumption rule may again have caused the increase in claims;
however, data for Consumer Electronics presented below indicate that the exten-
sion of the limitation did cause a substantial increase in claims in this sector,
which indicates that the increase shown in Table 2 was in large part due to the
new limitation period.
Apart from the survey data, the Organization of Wholesale Distributors of
Consumer Electronics in Denmark (BFE) provided data showing the increase in
the number of repairs and replacements as a consequence of the new deadline. The
data covered audio-visual products such as DVD’s, videos, disc-men, videocam-
eras, and radio and television, and is graphically depicted in Møgelvang-Hansen
and Lando (2006). For present purposes, the overall conclusion is that for this
industry, the extension of the limitation period resulted in a 20% to 30% increase
in the number of warranted claims for repair and replacement. As the radio and
television sector was about average in Table 2 above, this suggests that the average
increase in the sectors under investigation was in the neighborhood of 20%.
6.3.2. The Increase in the Number of Unwarranted Claims
The survey also contained the following question:
Question: Has the number of unwarranted claims increased after the change
of law21?
L. Inc. S. inc. No change Fall Do not know answers
All sectors 7.7% 28.6% 56.8% .0% 7.0% 287
Used Cars 19.0% 38.1% 33.3% .0% 9.5% 21
Cars .0% 46.4% 50.0% .0% 3.6% 28
Computers/software 4.6% 20.0% 67.7% .0% 7.7% 65
Household appliances 4.3% 17.4% 73.9% .0% 4.3% 23
Furniture 9.4% 25.0% 50.0% .0% 15.6% 32
Radio and TV 5.3% 23.7% 60.5% .0% 10.5% 38
Clothing .0% 25.0% 68.8% .0% 6.3% 32
Shoes 16.1% 38.7% 45.2% .0% .0% 31
Telecommunication 23.5% 41.2% 35.3% .0% .0% 17
L. Inc: Large increase
21Again, it should be noted that the law has shifted the burden of proof for the first six
months which may perhaps aﬀect the results.
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S.inc: Small increase
Again, there are significant diﬀerences between the diﬀerent industries, re-
flecting nearly the same pattern as for the increase in claims. Overall, it appears
that the increase in the number of unwarranted claims was somewhat larger than
the increase in claims: On average, 29.6% respond that there has been either a
large or a small increase in the number of claims while more than 36% respond
that there has been either a large or small increase in the number of unwarranted
claims. This is at least indicative of a significant increase in unwarranted claims,
at least as perceived by retailers, consistent with the suggested rationale.
One caveat, however, must be mentioned. Part of the increase in the num-
ber of unwarranted claims as perceived by retailers22 may have been due to the
presumption rule, which for the first six months puts the burden of proof on the
seller. While claims raised under the presumption rule may have been legally
warranted, retailers may have considered them unwarranted.
Still, the evidence is consistent with a significant increase in the number of
unwarranted claims due to the extension of the limitation period.
7. Final Remarks
This section discusses the issue of buyer moral hazard, whether standards
of proof or definitions of a defective good could be time-variant, and how the
existence of warranties and contractually determined limitation periods should be
taken into account when setting the legal default rule.
On the issue of buyer moral hazard, the model can be reinterpreted to take
into account the fact that buyers use goods with diﬀerent intensity. In the model,
the state θ expresses the state of nature, but it could also express the intensity
of use of a given type of buyer. The density function h(θ) would then express
the distribution of types, and the quality of the good would determine a critical
intensity of use that the good would be able to withstand in period 1 and 2. In
this framework, it is natural to assume that the court can neither observe the
intensity of use nor the quality of the good (although both would sometimes be
detectable by the court). Presumptions then become critical: if the good should
not break down except under extreme use, the court would find for the buyer
while the court would require some concrete proof of a defect if the presumption
22Our impression was that the retailers were generally trustworthy in their answers to our
survey questions. For example, many reported that the new law had not aﬀected their costs.
But of course their answers are subjective.
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is in favor of the seller. The logic of the rationale suggested in the present article
would translate into this setting as follows. As time passes after purchase, the
presumption shifts in favor of the seller; at some point, while there may be buyers
with justified claims, their number will be small, and so the incentive benefit of
allowing their claim may be less than the administrative cost of verifying whether
claims fall in this category.
As noted above, it may be argued that cutting oﬀ claims is not the only way to
lower the number of claims raised. One might instead require a higher standard
of proof or give a right to remedies only when the good is very significantly
below adequate quality. Within the logic of the model, the buyer would then be
discouraged from bringing a claim, unless it has clear merit. Indeed, nothing in
the model provides reason to believe that an all-or-nothing solution is preferable
to a more graduated approach that lowers the buyer’s right over time. However,
communicating to retailers or consumers time-varying standards of proof or time-
varying required levels of quality would seem a diﬃcult task in practice, and there
would be uncertainty about when a dysfunction is clearly a defect23. Hence, the
cost of administering the rule, of verifying whether claims belong in this category,
may well from some point onward outweigh the incentive benefit of allowing a
limited number of clearly justified claims.
How the legal regulation interacts with market forces such as warranties has
not been touched upon in this article. Naturally, to the extent that goods that
are supposed to last for many years are covered by warranties of longer duration
(although, as noted by Emons the duration of warranties tends to be shorter
than the life-time of the product), the optimal default rule, which then regulate
goods of shorter expected lifetimes, will as mentioned also be shorter. More
interestingly, one may wonder how the legally stipulated limitation periods, mainly
the minimum period which applies to consumer sales, interacts with the signaling
role24 of warranties25. This is left for future research.
Appendix A:
23Time varying fees for bringing claims also seems a remote possibility in practice for similar
reasons.
24First analyzed by Spence [15] and Grossman [7].
25In the Danish context, warranties are restricted by a regulation by the Consumer ´Om-
budsmand´, who has barred warranties of shorter duration than the mandatory limitation
period. Thereby, the extension of the limitation period led to a decrease in the number of
warranties. However, insurance policies similar to warranties have in some branches substituted
for warranties.
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This appendix will prove that when c(q
r)
(σh(qrσ)+ρh(qrρ)) lies in the interval [τs(1− F (0)), R+ τs],
and the derivative of c(q)
(σh(qσ)+ρh(qρ)) is positive, i.e. when
c0(qi)− σ2(R+ τs)h0(qiσ)− ρ2(R+ τs)h0(qiρ)
is positive, then qr is an optimal choice for the seller given that it is the required
level of quality.
Note first that the derivative of total cost with respect to qi when qi is below
qr is
c(qi)− σ(R+ τs)h(qiσ)− ρ(R+ τs)h(qiρ)
This will be negative when qi < qr given that
c(qr)
(σh(qrσ)+ρh(qrρ)) < R + τs, and
given that the derivative of c(q)
(σh(qσ)+ρh(qρ)) is positive (for then
c(q)
(σh(qσ)+ρh(qρ)) will
decrease when q decreases, thus keeping below R + τs). When the derivative of
total cost is negative, increasing quality will be worthwhile when qi < qr. Hence,
qr dominates any qi below it.
The right-hand derivative with respect to qi at qr equals c(qr)−τs(1−F (0))(h(qrσ)σ+
ρh(qrρ)) as administrative costs due to mistakes are eliminated by an increase in
quality in a small interval to the right of the equilibrium state. If τs(1− F (0)) <
c(qr)
(σh(qrσ)+ρh(qrρ)) ,this will also hold for q > q
r when the derivative of c(q)σh(qσ)+ρh(qρ)
is positive. When it holds, it is preferable to lower qi when qi > qr, hence qr is
optimal.
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